Historical+Context


 * Ceasefire signed in nine-year Bougainville war**

By Peter Symonds 8 May 1998
Under a ceasefire agreement signed on the island of Bougainville on April 30 between the Papua New Guinea (PNG) government and separatist leaders, Australian troops will maintain a substantial and ongoing presence on PNG soil for the first time since formal independence was granted to the former colony in 1975.

The ceasefire has thus far halted fighting after a bitter nine-year war of secession. But the agreement, jointly worked out by the Australian and New Zealand governments, has nothing to do with "peace" or providing "humanitarian relief" for the war-ravaged Bougainville people. It is aimed at shoring up the substantial economic and strategic interests of Australian business. Of the 365-strong "peace-monitoring group" on Bougainville, 239 are Australian troops, accompanied by 16 Australian officials, along with soldiers and civilian personnel from New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer who, with his New Zealand counterpart Don McKinnon, supervised the signing ceremonies in the Bougainville provincial capital of Arawa, has denied any ulterior motives in supplying troops. In particular, he has dismissed suggestions of pushing for the re-opening of Panguna copper mine, one of the world's largest and most profitable before its closure in 1989 by secessionist forces. The mine is owned by the major Australian-British consortium Rio Tinto, with a minority shareholding held by the PNG government. Despite Downer's denials, by underwriting the cost of the military force and promising to provide $130 million in reconstruction aid over the next five years, Canberra holds the whip hand in determining the outcome of political negotiations, due to start under the Lincoln Agreement, signed in New Zealand in January. It will also play a dominant role in determining the composition of the Bougainville Reconciliation Government, due to be elected before December. The ceasefire agreement has divided the Bougainville separatists. Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) leader Francis Ona refused to join his deputy, Joseph Kabui, and BRA commander Sam Kauona in signing the ceasefire agreement. Ona has since issued a shoot-to-kill order against Australian and New Zealand troops in areas of Bougainville under his control. The Australian troops are unarmed at present. But if Ona or any other dissident BRA group threatens Australian designs on the island, its military, together with PNG troops, are clearly capable of launching offensive actions. Undoubtedly, elements of the planned Bougainville police force, to be trained by the monitoring group and composed of ex-BRA fighters, will also be utilised. Australian governments, both Labor and Liberal, have adopted a two-pronged strategy in dealing with the BRA rebellion -- supplying military hardware and training to the PNG Defence Forces, on the one hand, and seeking to cultivate a more pliable Bougainville leadership, on the other. Fighting erupted in mid-1989 when Ona and other local landowners, became frustrated by the refusal of Rio Tinto management and PNG leaders to provide compensation for the copper mine's environmental damage or a share of the profits. They took up arms, forced the mine's closure and began a war of attrition against troops of the PNG Defence Forces. The BRA's operations threatened not only the lucrative operations at Panguna but other giant gold, copper and oil ventures at Ok Tedi, Lihir and elsewhere in PNG. If Bougainville landowners succeeded in their claims, then landowners and villagers in other areas might be encouraged to do the same. When the PNG troops failed to militarily defeat the BRA guerrilla forces, despite the use of Australia-supplied helicopters, light aircraft, gunboats and other sophisticated weaponry, the PNG government, with the full backing of the then Labor government in Canberra, imposed a barbaric economic blockade on Bougainville, stopping supplies of foodstuffs and medicines. Between 10,000 and 20,000 people died as a result of the blockade or in fighting -- out of a population of about 160,000. Preventable diseases like malaria, skin diseases, leprosy, tuberculosis and gastroenteritis claimed the lives of many, particularly young children. The PNG military repeatedly failed to regain control over Bougainville. Last year, matters came to a head when the previous PNG prime minister, Julius Chan, signed a $A46 million contract with a British company, Sandline International, to provide mercenaries and sophisticated equipment to spearhead a military operation on Bougainville. The Sandline operation was a desperate attempt to reopen the Panguna mine as a means of overcoming the government's continuing financial crisis. When the mine was shut down, the government in Port Moresby lost 20 percent of its revenue, together with 44 percent of the country's export earnings. But Chan's designs cut across plans by the Australian government to negotiate a political arrangement with sections of the BRA leadership. Details of the secret Sandline operation were leaked in the Australian press, precipitating a political crisis in PNG. Chan was forced to setup a public inquiry and stand aside, and then lost his parliamentary seat in the national elections held last June. Negotiations under the auspices of the New Zealand government began soon after Bill Skate was installed as PNG prime minister. A temporary truce was established in October 1997, followed by the signing of January's Lincoln Agreement, which set out the terms for the signing of a permanent ceasefire. The fighting has ceased but no agreement has been reached over the issues which led to the war. The BRA leaders continue to insist that their goal is "independence" -- a demand that Skate has emphatically ruled out. He has even hinted that his government may not carry out the phased withdrawal of PNG troops from the island, as required in the ceasefire terms. One thing is certain. If a deal is finally reached then its terms, including the degree of autonomy for Bougainville, will be determined, not by the needs and aspirations of the ordinary workers and villagers, but by the economic interests of the Australian companies and the local ruling cliques in Port Moresby and Arawa. Since attaining nominal independence from Australia in 1975, PNG's businessmen, politicians and top public servants have been little more than the local brokers for transnational corporations like Rio Tinto. The ruling elite has been riven by regional rivalries and conflicts which have only been exacerbated by the country's complete dependence on the exploitation of rich mineral deposits. In March, the kina plunged to a new low of US50 cents amid continuing economic and political uncertainty. The BRA leadership is little different from its counterparts elsewhere in PNG. While the BRA drew widespread support from those who had suffered for years as a result of Rio Tinto's operations, the aim of leaders like Ona was to siphon off a larger share of the mine's profits into the hands of the local "bigmen" -- landowners, local politicians and small businessmen. The BRA's demand for Bougainville "independence" never challenged the framework of capitalist exploitation. Rather Ona, Kabui and Kauona were looking to cut their own deals with the major regional powers -- Australia or New Zealand -- and with the foreign corporations looking to exploit the island's resources. None of the BRA leaders have ever elaborated an economic and political program for an "independent" Bougainville that would in any way deal with the needs and aspirations of the majority of workers and poor villagers on the island. A genuine struggle against the predatory practices of giant corporations such as Rio Tinto would require the linking up with workers elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, Australia, Indonesia and internationally who face similar exploitation. The BRA, however, is based on a narrow and divisive parochialism, which pits "blackskins" -- Bougainvilleans are known for the coal black skin colour -- against the "redskins" of the rest of PNG. Most of the BRA leaders have had little difficulty accommodating themselves to the new political arrangements. Ona remains camped in the jungle with an estimated 200 BRA fighters but his political perspective is not fundamentally different. He is simply looking for a better deal with Australia, New Zealand or another major power.
 * A two-pronged strategy**
 * No agreement on secession**

taken from http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/may1998/boug-m8.shtml

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